Fair-Value Report — Jimu Group Limited (8187.HK)

Insider Signal

This is a genuine open-market accumulation signal: all three tranches carry reason code 1101 (on-exchange purchase), there is no subscription/placing, pledge, scheme, or nominee-custodian language attached to this filer, and the buyer crossed from below the 5% notification threshold to 7.89% through real cash purchases (≈5.57m shares, ≈HK$2.87m total) over five weeks. It passes the Step 1 gate.

One open question we could not resolve: over almost exactly this same window, the company's only other disclosed substantial shareholder, Sharp Ally International Limited, saw its stake collapse from 17.45% (26.46m shares, per the FY2025 Annual Report) to 13.37% to 4.14% (6.28m shares) in DI filings tagged "subscription to new shares" even though its own absolute share count fell rather than rose. We cannot confirm or rule out that Huang's on-market buying was substantially absorbing stock sold down by the outgoing top shareholder rather than representing entirely fresh outside capital. Total shares in issue held roughly flat near 151.68m throughout, so this is a shareholder-composition question, not a dilution question.

Verified Snapshot

Price sourced from Investing.com (delayed quote, 18 Sep 2026) and independently corroborated by a separate report of a ~25.5% intraday surge to HK$0.64 on volume of 1.85m shares vs a 30-day average of 1.39m. Both are well above the prior close of HK$0.545 and far above the HK$0.50–0.55 the insider actually paid.

Business

Jimu Group is a GEM-listed Cayman-incorporated investment holding company engaged in the design, sourcing, marketing and wholesale/retail sale of footwear, apparel and sports-related peripheral products in Hong Kong and Canada. It listed in 2016 as Ever Smart International Holdings (built on the Luxey China ODM footwear business), renamed to Jimu Group in 2018, and detoured into P2P/loan-facilitation technology before China's regulatory crackdown forced a retreat. On 27 November 2025 the Group disposed of its remaining P2P/loan-era subsidiaries (Active Earner Limited, Allied Charm Creation Limited, Jimu Sports Inc.) for cash, leaving footwear/apparel trading as the core business again. FY2025 revenue rebounded 174% year-on-year as the Group pushed wholesale channels, but H1 2026 shows that momentum stalling (+3% YoY) while losses widened sharply.

Valuation

Method: per house policy for loss-making, story-pivot micro-caps, we use an asset (price-to-book) anchor plus a revenue-multiple optionality case — not a DCF, which would imply a forecastable cash-flow path this business does not have.

The H1 2026 loss alone (HK$6.48m) already exceeds the entire FY2025 full-year loss (HK$5.84m) and exceeds the Group's whole 31-December-2025 cash pile (HK$2.2m). Simple arithmetic — audited FY2025 equity of HK$10.22m less the unaudited H1 2026 loss of HK$6.48m — would put pro-forma equity around HK$3.7m by 30 June 2026 (≈HK$0.024/share). This is our own back-of-envelope subtraction, not a filed balance-sheet figure — no interim balance sheet was independently retrievable for this report; treat it as illustrative of the trend, not as book value.

Reverse read

At HK$0.63/share (HK$95.6m market cap): ≈9.3x the last audited book value, ≈25x our rough post-H1-2026 pro-forma book estimate, and ≈3.0x trailing-twelve-month revenue for a business that is not merely unprofitable but getting less profitable quarter over quarter. That is a valuation more typical of a scaling, profitable consumer brand than a GEM trading company that just finished unwinding a failed fintech detour and whose one attempted external capital raise (a HK$25.1m subscription agreed with China Mining United Holding Group in November 2024) was extended five times and ultimately terminated in May 2025 without completing.

Scenario table (asset + optionality, no DCF)

Peer context

A clean, currently-listed peer set is not really available for a company this small and illiquid: the closest historical comparable, Bossini International Holdings (0592.HK), was privatised and delisted in March 2025, and HKEX GEM/SEHK apparel tickers get recycled onto unrelated companies, which makes automated peer data unreliable rather than merely thin. We do not have a verifiable peer P/B table we're comfortable publishing; the valuation above rests on Jimu's own audited book value and revenue, which is the more defensible anchor here.

Conclusion

The underlying insider signal is real: HUANG YI YUAN made three genuine on-exchange purchases, not a placement, pledge, scheme, or nominee transaction, moving from 4.22% to 7.89% for roughly HK$2.87m in cash. That passes our gate. But two things break the case for following it at today's price: first, the disclosure reached the market ~3 months late and the stock has already run 15–25% past every price the insider actually paid, so there is no "buy alongside the buyer" opportunity left; second, the fundamentals have deteriorated since the buying happened — H1 2026 losses widened 64.7% while revenue growth stalled, against a balance sheet that was already thin (HK$10.2m equity, HK$2.2m cash) before that loss hit. At ~9–25x book and ~3x trailing sales for a still-lossmaking GEM shell with one failed capital raise on its recent record, the price has moved further from any reasonable anchor than the signal justifies. Signal real; price already wrong, and getting more so today.

Key Risks

• Illiquidity/volatility: a >15% single-day move on ~1.85m shares traded shows how thin this name is; entries and exits can both be costly.
• Further dilution: the Group has an active share option scheme (10% mandate) and a recent history of attempting large subscriptions; any future placing at a discount to market would hurt this thesis further.
• Opaque buyer motive: HUANG YI YUAN's identity, relationship (if any) to Sharp Ally, and intentions are not disclosed beyond the DI filings.
• Late-filing compliance flag: a ~3-month delay in DI notification across three separate tranches is unusual and worth monitoring for further governance issues.
• Deteriorating trend: H1 2026 shows losses accelerating even as FY2025 had looked like a turnaround; one half-year is not enough to call the trend, but it moves the wrong way.
• Unaudited interim data: H1 2026 figures used here are drawn from secondary aggregator coverage of the interim announcement, not an independently retrieved primary filing; we were unable to pull the HKEXnews PDF directly.

Sources

• HKEX DI filings IS20260917E00124/125/126 (filer: HUANG YI YUAN, stock 08187) — raw data captured by this scanner's daily HKEX pull
• Jimu Group Limited, Annual Report 2025 (year ended 31 Dec 2025), published 26 Mar 2026 — hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/gem/2026/0326/2026032602652.pdf
• Jimu Group interim results for six months ended 30 June 2026 (board-approved 17 Aug 2026) — figures cross-corroborated via multiple secondary aggregator summaries (iTiger, TradingView news index); primary HKEXnews PDF not independently retrieved
• stockanalysis.com/quote/hkg/8187 — TTM revenue/market data, 17 Sep 2026
• Investing.com equities quote (Jimu Group Ltd / Ever Smart International Holdings), 18 Sep 2026
• Meyka market report — intraday surge/volume data, 18 Sep 2026